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Abstract
This paper presents an overlapping generations model with altruistic con-
sumers, in which pension funds, by holding a signicant share of capital assets,
produce non competitive behavior. We study the consequences of such be-
havior on capital accumulation and welfare in the long run when subsidies are
associated with contributions to pension funds. If bequests are operative and
the subsidy rate is not too high, the capital stock increases with the intro-
duction of pension funds, and this increases long run utility. If bequests are
not operative without pension funds, the rise in long-run welfare is no longer
guaranteed, even if the subsidy rate is low.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the consequences of imperfect competition on capital accumu-
lation. We consider an equilibrium concept using the Cournot-Walras equilibrium,
according to which some agents, having a signicant size compared to the whole
economy, take into account the inuence of their choice on the equilibrium. A Wal-
rasian equilibrium is formed, which depends on the quantities chosen by the strategic
agents who play between themselves a game of the Cournot-Nash type.
From a theoretical point of view, our work can be seen as a rst attempt to de-
velop this concept within a dynamic framework. Indeed, the literature in dynamic
macroeconomics has mainly focused on the study of monopolistic competition (fol-
lowing Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). In overlapping generation models, few studies have
explored other concepts of imperfect competition. For instance, Laitner (1982) stud-
ies the consequences on long-run capital accumulation of the existence of oligopolies
on commodity markets. DAspremont, Dos Santos-Ferreira and Gerard-Varet (1991,
1995) consider an overlapping generations model without capital, where rms act
as Cournot oligopolists in the good market.
From another perspective, we argue that this equilibrium concept turns out to
be fruitful for analyzing some features of contemporary economies, in particular, the
impact of pension funds. Indeed, the growing size of pension funds has led to the
emergence of economic agents who hold a signicant share of the capital assets of the
whole economy1, and who may therefore inuence equilibrium prices and quantities.
In practice, the concentration of capital gives pension funds the power to inuence
the managers of the rms in order to increase the return on their investment.2 At the
macroeconomic level, this may modify the distribution of income between workers
and pensioners and may have consequences for capital accumulation and welfare in
the long-run.
Until now, the literature on the transition from pay-as-you-go to funded pension
systems has eluded pension funds activism3. The conventional wisdom about private
funded systems is that they are neutral with respect to capital accumulation and
welfare. Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, assuming perfect capital markets,
a fully-funded system has no impact on aggregate savings. On the contrary, we
argue that the activism of pension funds induces a capital market imperfection at
the macroeconomic level, when these funds acquire su¢ cient market power.
1In the US, pension funds assets were equivalent to 24.3 % of GDP in 1981 and grew to 73.9 %
in 1999. In the same period, pension funds assets in the United Kingdom were growing from 22.4
% to 87.8 % of GDP.
2The literature on corporate governance gives some theoretical justications for the activism of
pension funds on the management of rms. As soon as a shareholder holds a su¢ ciently large frac-
tion of capital, his gain from activism can exceed the monitoring cost (see, for instance, Shleifer and
Vishny (1986), Holmström and Tirole (1993), Huddart (1993) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi
(1997)).
3See Feldstein (1998) or Belan and Pestieau (1999) for a survey. Breyer (1989) analyzes the
transition issue in the standard Diamond (1965) model with inelastic labor supply. Homburg
(1990), Breyer and Straub (1993) and Brunner (1994, 1996) have considered the case of elastic
labor supply. Furthermore, Belan, Michel and Pestieau (1998) and Gyárfás and Marquardt (2001)
study the transition in an endogenous growth model with technological externality.
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In this respect, our paper can also be viewed as a contribution to a growing
literature about the relationship between nancial structure and economic growth.
The noncompetitive behavior of pension funds introduces a market imperfection
in nancial intermediation. In particular, our contribution shares some concerns
with recent papers that focus on banking market structure and its relationship with
capital accumulation (e.g. Cetorelli, 1997, Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000 and Guzman,
2000).
In order to capture the consequences of pension funds activism on capital ac-
cumulation and welfare, we consider an overlapping generation model where people
live for two periods and are altruistic to their o¤spring (Barro, 1974). Consumers
allocate their savings between pension funds and personal savings. With these con-
tributions, pension funds hold a signicant part of the productive sector. They are
able to intervene in the management of the rms that they hold, and consequently,
in the equilibrium resulting from the competitive behavior of the other agents. The
strategic variable of pension funds is the demand for labor by rms that they con-
trol. They take into account the e¤ect of their labor demand on the equilibrium
prices and display Nash behavior. This equilibrium concept follows the line of the
Cournot-Walras equilibrium dened by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) and studied by
Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997).
In this framework, Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002) consider agents without
bequest motive (as in Diamond, 1965) and show that the introduction of pension
funds modies the income distribution between labor and capital, by reducing wages
and increasing savings returns. Since savings are based on wages, the distribution
of income that favors capital income will diminish savings and capital stock in the
long run. The present paper questions whether this mechanism is relevant when
savings are based on labor earnings and past savings returns. We consider dynasties
of altruistic agents whose savings depend on current wages and bequests that they
receive from their parents. In these cases, past capital returns, which should be
higher with pension funds activism, will inuence current and future savings and
may compensate for the impact of the fall in wages.
In practice, scal incentives are usually associated with contributions to pension
funds. For instance, in the US, employers can deduce contributions to pension funds
from their prots. We model such a tax exemption as subsidies on savings invested
in pension funds. These subsidies will increase the importance of the pension funds
in the economy and allows us to parameterize their size. To some extent, such scal
incentives will qualitatively have the same consequences as subsidies on savings in
a model without imperfect competition. But in addition to these usual e¤ects, they
introduce some supplementary distortions related to the noncompetitive behavior
of pension funds.
We study the impact of imperfect competition and subsidies on capital accumu-
lation and welfare in the long run. In particular, when bequests are operative, we
show that, despite the fall in wages, capital stock increases with the introduction of
pension funds and is an increasing function of the subsidy rate. As a consequence,
long-run utility increases for small values of the subsidy rate. But it decreases above
a certain threshold, since the economy is in overaccumulation, too far from the
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Golden Rule, and the distortions introduced by the savings subsidies and imperfect
competition become too high. Nevertheless, when bequests are constrained in the
economy without pension funds, there exist situations where long-run welfare with
pension funds is lower than without pension funds, whatever the rate of subsidy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and notably
introduces the game between rms managed by pension funds. In section 3, we
analyze the e¤ect of pension funds in the long run when bequests are positive. In
section 4, we consider the situation where the constraint of non-negative bequests
may be binding. Section 5 concludes. The most demanding proofs are given in the
Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Consumer behavior
We consider an overlapping generations model of agents living for two periods. The
size of generation t isNt and each agent has (1+n) children. We assume that parents
care about their childrens welfare by weighting the childrens utility in their own
utility function (Barro (1974)). The utility of a generation born at time t, Vt, is
given by
Vt = U(ct; dt+1) + Vt+1; 0 <  < 1
where U satises the following assumption
Assumption 1 U is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing with respect to
both consumptions, strictly concave and satises, for all positive c and d: U 0c (0; d) =
+1, U 0d (c; 0) = +1. Moreover, for all positive c and d,
U 0dU
00
cc < U
0
cU
00
cd and U
0
cU
00
dd < U
0
dU
00
cd
which implies that both consumptions are normal goods.
In their rst period of life, individuals born in t work and receive a wage wt.
In addition to wage income, they receive a bequest xt from their parents and pay
a lump-sum tax  1t . They consume ct and save the remainder. We assume that
individuals allocate their total savings between two types of investments: personal
savings s0t and contributions to pension funds s
1
t . Gross returns are respectively
denoted by R0t+1 and R
1
t+1. Contributions to pension funds are subsidized at rate
t per unit saved. In their second period of life, people receive returns on savings,
pay a lump-sum tax  2t+1 and allocate net resources between consumption dt+1 and
bequests xt+1 to their (1 + n) children. Thus
xt + wt    1t + ts1t = ct + s0t + s1t
R0t+1s
0
t +R
1
t+1s
1
t    2t+1 = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1
4
Bequests must be non-negative : xt+1  0.
With perfect capital market, the arbitrage between both types of savings implies
the equality of net returns, i.e.
R1t+1
1  t = R
0
t+1 (1)
The net investment expenditure of an agent of generation t is
t = s
0
t + (1  t)s1t (2)
The maximum of total utility is given by the following recursive relation:
V t (xt) = max
ct;t;dt+1;xt+1

U(ct; dt+1) + V

t+1(xt+1)
	
subject to
xt + wt    1t = ct + t (3)
R0t+1t    2t+1 = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 (4)
xt+1  0 (5)
For any positive t, V t (xt) represents the maximum utility of a young agent born in
t when he inherits xt. These are the value functions of the innite horizon problems
max
P+1
j=0 
jU(ct+j; dt+j+1) subject to (3), (4) and (5).
This maximization problem leads to the following rst-order conditions
U
0
c(ct; dt+1) = R
0
t+1U
0
d(ct; dt+1) (6)
 (1 + n)U 0d(ct; dt+1) + U
0
c(ct+1; dt+2)  0 (7)
The second condition holds with equality if xt+1 > 0. Equation (6) is the standard
condition for individual life-cycle allocation. Condition (7) is a condition for optimal
allocation between parent and children. If xt+1 > 0, it states that the marginal utility
loss from reduction of a parents consumption will equal the marginal utility gain of
an increase in the bequest.
2.2 Firms
Firms live for one period. Their capital stock is xed at the beginning of the period,
with total depreciation. There exist two types of rms. Some are controlled by
pension funds; their entire capital stock consists of contributions to pension funds
in the preceding period. Other rms are independent of pension funds ; their cap-
ital stock consists of personal savings in the preceding period. Both types of rm
have the same technology using capital and labor as inputs: F (K;L). F is linear
homogeneous. Marginal products are positive and decreasing.
The rms independent of pension funds behave competitively. Thus, one can
consider a representative rm for this sector (which we call respectively competitive
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rm and competitive sector in the following). At period t, its capital stock is K0t =
Nt 1s0t 1.
We assume pension funds are represented by m rms, with capital stocks de-
noted by Kit , i = 1; :::;m, such that
Pm
i=1K
i
t = Nt 1s
1
t 1. By holding a signicant
share of the total capital stock, these rms have a market power and behave non-
competitively. For simplicity, we assume that each pension funds holds the whole
capital of a single rm. But, our model encompasses a wider range of occurrences.
For instance, if several pension funds share the capital stock of a single rm, the ob-
jective of this rm would remain the same since pension funds would be unanimous
for maximizing total prots. Moreover, our framework can also represent the case
of one pension fund that holds the capital of several rms: since technology exhibits
constant returns to scale, those rms can be aggregated.
Firms owned by pension funds act noncompetitively on the labor market. They
do not take the wage rate as given. They maximize their prots taking into account
the impact of their labor demand on the equilibrium wage. So doing, they exert a
detrimental e¤ect on the wage rate which increases capital return. Their behavior
harms the workers for the benet of capital owners. Note that in our two-period
OLGmodel, the workers are the young and the capital owners are the old. Therefore,
here, pension funds represent interests of the old.
2.3 Equilibrium between noncompetitive rms
The behavior of noncompetitive rm is described by a game that we call the Firms
Cournot-Walras Game:4
Denition 1 (FirmsCournot-Walras Game, FCWG) 1. Let K0t be the
capital stock of the competitive rm and Kit , i = 1; :::;m, the capital stocks
of the noncompetitive rms. Labor supply is Nt.
2. The strategy of player i (the noncompetitive rm i) is its labor demand Lit  0
(i = 1; :::;m).
3. For any vector of strategies of the noncompetitive rms (Lit)i=1;:::;m, a com-
petitive equilibrium exists if
Pm
i=1 L
i
t < Nt
5 and it consists of a price wt
and a quantity L0t , such that the competitive rm maximizes its prots L
0
t =
argmaxL F (K
0
t ; L)   wtL and labor supply equals labor demand : L0t = Nt  Pm
i=1 L
i
t.
4The denition of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium rests on the study of the general competitive
equilibrium when the strategic decisions of the non-competitive players are xed (Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972)). In our model, given the capital stocks (resulting from past decisions) and the total
labor supply (which is inelastic), it is possible to dene such a static game for rms.
5If
Pm
i=1 L
i
t  Nt; a rationing scheme could be considered. To simplify, we assume that in that
case, payo¤s of the m players are equal to 0: Of course, this case never does occur at equilibrium.
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4. Payo¤ of player i is its prots : it = F (K
i
t ; L
i
t)   wtLit if
Pm
i=1 L
i
t < Nt:
Payo¤ is 0 if
Pm
i=1 L
i
t  Nt.6
Given this denition, it is now possible to consider the equilibrium of the game.
Denition 2 (FirmsCournot-Walras Equilibrium, FCWE) A FirmsCournot-
Walras Equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium (Lit)i=1;:::;m of the FCWG. It is non-trivial
if
Pm
i=1 L
i
t < Nt:
Note that with the assumption of inelastic labor supply, the competitive behavior
of the consumers does not interact with the rmsCournot-Walras equilibrium.
Let us compare this economy with the standard framework where all rms behave
competitively. The game under consideration involves an additional type of agent.
Besides competitive rms, there exist noncompetitive rms with labor demand as
a strategic variable. Given the labor demands of all strategic agents, there exists
a Walrasian equilibrium that determines the value of their prots (payo¤s). These
agents internalize the e¤ect of their labor demand on the Walrasian equilibrium in
order to maximize their prots. In addition, following a Cournotian approach, they
take the strategies of other players as given. This results in a Nash equilibrium. The
following proposition characterizes the FCWE and states existence and uniqueness.
Since capital stocks are given, one can consider labor capital ratios lit = L
i
t=K
i
t
instead of labor demand Lit as the strategic variable for rm i.
Proposition 1 Assume F 000LLL  0.7 For given positive capital stocksK0t and (Kit)i=1;:::;m;
there exists a unique non-trivial FCWE. This equilibrium is characterized by the
labor-capital ratios l0t ; l
1
t ; :::: l
m
t which satisfy for i = 1; :::m;
F
0
L
 
1; lit
  F 0L  1; l0t + litKitK0t F 00LL  1; l0t  = 0; (8)
and the equilibrium condition on the labor market
K0t l
0
t +
mX
i=1
litK
i
t = Nt: (9)
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
As shown in Appendix 1, equation (8) represents the best-response function at
equilibrium. Noncompetitive rms have a higher marginal productivity than com-
petitive rms. The di¤erence comes from their strategic behavior which internalizes
6Notice that the payo¤ is expressed in real terms. As for the Cournot-Walras equilibrium, the
choice of the numéraire will not a¤ect the equilibrium of the game.
7With a CES production function F (K;L) = A [aK + bL]1=, A > 0 a > 0, b > 0 and  < 1,
F
000
LLL has the same sign as (1 + )b + a(2   )KL . Thus the condition F
000
LLL  0 is satised
with    1, i.e. when the elasticity of substitution is not too low (larger or equal to 1=2). Note
also that if Kit is small enough, the assumption F
000
LLL  0 is no longer necessary.
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the e¤ect of their labor demand on the equilibrium wage and, therefore, on their
prots.
Since F "LL < 0, equation (8) implies
lit < l
0
t ; for i = 1; :::m:
By demanding less labor by unit of capital, noncompetitive rms tend to push down
the equilibrium wage, in order to raise their capital return.
Proposition (1) characterizes the FCWE for all initial allocations of capital
stocks. Nevertheless, the arbitrage conditions resulting from the consumer program
govern the allocation of capital stock between rms. Indeed, with perfect capital
markets, arbitrage conditions (1) at equilibrium imply the equality of all net capital
returns
Rit = R
1
t = (1  t 1)R0t .
At the FCWE, the equilibrium wage is:
wt = F
0
L
 
1; l0t

. (10)
Thus, the return to capital is
Rit = 
i
t=K
i
t = F (1; l
i
t)  litF
0
L(1; l
0
t ) (11)
for a noncompetitive rm i and,
R0t = F
0
K
 
1; l0t

(12)
for the competitive rm. The following proposition features the FCWE which sat-
ises arbitrage conditions of the consumers.
Proposition 2 The equality of all returns to capital Rit implies that noncompetitive
rms have identical labor capital ratios lit = l
1
t and identical capital stocks K
i
t = K
1
t .
Moreover, the equality of returns to capital between competitive and noncompetitive
rms results in the following relation between l0t and l
1
t :
F
 
1; l1t
  l1tF 0L  1; l0t  = (1  t 1)F 0K  1; l0t  (13)
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
At equilibrium, the labor-capital ratios of the noncompetitive rms are equal
and smaller than the total labor-capital ratio in the economy, lt = Nt=(K0t +mK
1
t ).
Reducing their labor demand, the noncompetitive rms induce a lower wage in the
competitive sector. This increases the capital return in the noncompetitive sector
and in the competitive sector. On the one hand, for the competitive sector, as
lt < l
0
t ; it follows R
0
t = F
0
K(1; l
0
t ) > F
0
K(1;
lt) where F 0K(1; lt) is the capital return at
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the competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, for the noncompetitive sector at
equilibrium, by denition (cf. appendix 1),
l1t = argmax
l
t(l; l
1
t )
s. t. 0  l  Nt
K1t
  (m  1)l1t
where
t(l; l
1
t )  F (1; l)  lF
0
L

1;
Nt   lK1t   (m  1)l1tK1t
K0t

Since
0  lt  Nt
K1t
  (m  1)l1t
the competitive labor-capital ratio lt is achievable for the noncompetitive rm. Thus,
we have:
t(l
1
t ; l
1
t ) > t(
lt; l
1
t )
and since t(l; l1t ) is decreasing with respect to l
1
t ; we obtain:
R1t = t(l
1
t ; l
1
t ) > t(
lt; l
1
t ) > t(
lt; lt) = F
0
K(1;
lt)
At equilibrium, the capital return in the noncompetitive sector is greater than its
level at the competitive equilibrium without pension funds.
Notice that the comparison of equilibrium capital returns leads to
R0t =
R1t
1  t 1 > R
1
t > F
0
K(1;
lt)
Noncompetitive rms exert a positive externality on competitive rms. The former
push down the equilibrium wage by reducing their labor-capital ratio, which is detri-
mental for their capital return. The latter benet from this fall in the wage rate
and take advantage of a higher labor-capital ratio. A positive subsidy rate allows
for the equality of net returns.
Remark 1 The number of pension funds m is exogenously given. An interesting
extension would be to make this parameter endogenous. For instance, one may
introduce a xed cost for each pension fund that can be interpreted as the cost for
activism: managers monitoring, lobbying, etc... Under this assumption, the gross
capital return R1 increases with the capital stock held by the pension fund. Therefore,
the number of pension funds would be the maximum value of m compatible with the
equality between the gross capital return R1 and the competitive return R0:
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
Pension funds are created in period 0. In period 0, the capital stock is given and all
rms are competitive. Production is F (K0; N0), and prices are
w0 = F
0
L(K0; N0) and R
0
0 = F
0
K(K0; N0) (14)
9
There are N 1 old agents in t = 0, who hold an equal part s 1 = K0=N 1 of the
initial capital stock. They allocate their income R0s 1    20 between consumption
and bequests
R00s 1    20 = d0 + (1 + n)x0; x0  0 (15)
satisfying
 (1 + n)U 0d(c 1; d0) + U
0
c(c0; d1)  0; = 0 if x0 > 0 (16)
where c 1 is given.
At equilibrium, taxes are equal to subsidies: Nt 1t +Nt 1
2
t = Ntts
1
t , or
 1t +
1
1 + n
 2t = ts
1
t (17)
and capital stocks result from savings of the preceding period. Its allocation with
equality of Kit+1 satises
K0t+1 = Nts
0
t ; K
i
t+1 =
1
m
Nts
1
t (18)
Denition 3 Given K0, c 1 and a sequence of subsidy rates (t)t0 and taxes
( 1t ; 
2
t )t0, an intertemporal equilibrium is dened by wages and capital returns, in-
dividual choices, capital and labor allocation, which constitute at each period a non
trivial FCWE with equal net returns to capital, and which satisfy all the equilibrium
conditions (1)-(7) and (8)-(18).
Steady state
Let us denote the capital stocks per young k0t =
K0t
Nt
and kit =
Kit
Nt
= k1t . We
assume that the subsidy rate  and the tax levels taxes  1 and  2 are constant. A
steady-state equilibrium consists of
(i) wages and capital returns
w = F
0
L(1; l
0); R0 = F
0
K(1; l
0) (19)
R1 = F (1; l1)  F 0L(1; l0)l1 = (1  )R0 (20)
(ii) individual choices, such that
x+ w    1 = c+ ; R0    2 = d+ (1 + n)x with x  0 (21)
U
0
c(c; d) = R
0U
0
d(c; d); (22)
 (1 + n)U 0d(c; d) + U
0
c(c; d)  0; = 0 if x > 0 (23)
(iii) the long run FCWE equations
F
0
L(1; l
1)  F 0L(1; l0) + l1
k1
k0
F 00LL(1; l
0) = 0 (24)
l0k0 +ml1k1 = 1 (25)
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(iv) other equilibrium conditions (respectively the capital market equilibrium and
the government budget constraint)
 = (1 + n)[k0 + (1  )mk1] (26)
 1 +
1
1 + n
 2 = mk1 (27)
Remark 2 If  = 0 (no subsidy), we obtain the standard competitive equilibrium.
As we have mentioned above, competitive rms o¤er a higher capital return than
noncompetitive rms since they benet from the fall in the wage rate without having
to reduce their labor-capital ratio. A positive subsidy rate allows the equality of net
returns and then makes possible the noncompetitive behavior of the pension funds.
If the subsidy rate is zero, pension funds are constrained to behave competitively,
otherwise they would not collect any savings. But if they behave competitively, they
have no impact on the equilibrium. Associating positive subsidy rate  > 0 with non-
competitive behavior allows to go further the conventional wisdom of the neutrality
of pension funds.
Two types of long-run equilibria may exist: equilibrium with positive bequests
(x > 0) and equilibrium with constrained bequests (x = 0). In these two types
of equilibria, pension funds may involve very di¤erent consequences on long-run
capital accumulation and welfare. If bequests are operative, both wages and capital
revenues are sources of savings. If bequests are non operative, the only source of
savings is wages. In the former case, since pension funds tend to increase capital
revenues and to decrease wages, one would expect a positive e¤ect of pension funds
on capital accumulation. In the latter case, however, pension funds could diminish
capital stock. We successively analyze both cases in the two following sections.
Remark 3 Existence of the equilibrium goes beyond this study and is deferred for
further work. Several studies have analysed the existence issue in the standard
Barros model without pension funds ( = 0): see Thibault (2000) and Michel,
Thibault and Vidal (2006). The introduction of pension funds adds a new di¢ culty:
the game between non-competitive rms a¤ects factor prices through the allocation
of labor and capital between the two sectors.
3 Operative bequests in the long run
The assumption of positive bequests implies that the arbitrage condition (23) is veri-
ed with equality. This determines return on capital of competitive rms (equations
(19), (22) and (23))
R0 = F
0
K(1; l
0) =
1 + n

(28)
Thus, the labor-capital ratio of the competitive rms is the modied golden-rule
level: l0 = l, dened by F
0
K(1; l
) = 1+n

.
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3.1 E¤ect of pension funds on capital accumulation
We analyze the e¤ect of pension funds using the subsidy rate . In fact, this parame-
ter governs the size of pension funds and so, the fraction of total capital stock held by
the noncompetitive rms. When  = 0, this fraction falls to zero and the economy
reaches the standard competitive equilibrium without pension funds. Moreover, 
increases total capital accumulation by subsidizing savings. Thus, we proceed by
analyzing the e¤ect of  on the capital accumulation and on the allocation of the
capital stock between the two sectors.
Since the labor-capital ratio in the competitive sector corresponds to the modied
golden rule, the arbitrage condition (20) determines the labor-capital ratio in the
noncompetitive rms. Then, the long-run equilibrium conditions (24) and (25)
determine the capital stocks. We study the e¤ect of  on capital accumulation,
more precisely on both k0 and k1 in the long run FCWE.
The labor-capital ratio of the noncompetitive rms l1 is the solution of
(1  )1 + n

= F (1; l1)  F 0L(1; l)l1  R(l1) (29)
When l1 increases from 0 to l, R(l1) increases from R(0) = F (1; 0) to R(l) =
F
0
K(1; l
) = 1+n

. Thus, (29) denes a decreasing function l1(), and l1() tends to
0 when  tends to  = 1   
1+n
F (1; 0). The condition on the subsidy rate for the
existence of an equilibrium (with positive bequests) is 0   < . We have  = 1 if
and only if F (1; 0) = 0.
Proposition 3 When  increases from 0 to , the capital per young agent in the
competitive sector k0() decreases, the capital per young agent in each noncompetitive
rm k1() increases, and total capital per young agent k() = k0() + mk1() in-
creases; k1() and k() increase without limit when  tends to . Given , 0 <  < ,
increasing the number m of noncompetitive rms implies a decrease in k0 and k1
and an increase in mk1 and k.
Proof. See Appendix 3. 
When the subsidy rate increases, the capital stock per young agent in the com-
petitive sector decreases. The relative weight of the competitive sector diminishes.
Since, at the steady-state, the labor-capital ratio in this sector is independent from
the subsidy rate, the fraction of labor in the competitive sector decreases. Thus,
necessarily, the fraction of labor in the noncompetitive sector increases. On the
other hand, we have seen that the labor-capital ratio in the noncompetitive sector
decreases and tends to zero when  tends to the upper bound . Thus, the capi-
tal stock per young agent in the noncompetitive sector increases and grows without
limit when  tends to . The fraction of the capital stock invested in the competitive
rms decreases with respect to  and becomes negligible at the limit.
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3.2 E¤ect of pension funds on welfare
An important question is for which values of the subsidy rate the long-run intertem-
poral utility with pension funds is larger than without pension funds. Recalling that
the fully competitive case occurs when  = 0 (no subsidy), one only needs to study
the e¤ect of  on welfare.
At the long-run steady state equilibrium, intertemporal utility
+1X
t=0
tU (ct; dt+1)
is equal to (1  ) 1 U (c; d). So, we analyze the e¤ect of pension funds of lifetime
utility U (c; d). Consumptions c and d can be determined by the arbitrage equation
(22) and the resource constraint
c+
d
1 + n
= k0F (1; l) +mk1F (1; l1)  (1 + n)(k0 +mk1) (30)
With operative bequests, the long-run gross interest rate R0 = (1 + n)= does not
depend on the subsidy rate. Thus, the marginal rate of substitution between both
consumptions u
0
c(c();d())
u
0
d(c();d())
is constant with . It follows that the subsidy rate  only
a¤ects consumptions c and d through the total production per young agent net of
investment (RHS of equation (30))
z() = k0F (1; l) +mk1F (1; l1)  (1 + n)(k0 +mk1)
where k0, k1and l1are functions of .
The following proposition states conditions under which pension funds have a
positive impact on long-run welfare. When bequests are operative (x > 0), the
equilibrium does not depend on the allocation of taxes between young and old ( 1
and  2). This results from the neutrality of net transfer between young and old.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case  2 = 0.
Proposition 4 Assume  2 = 0 and that bequests are operative in the economy
without subsidy. Then, there exists a threshold value of the subsidy rate ~ such
that, for all  2

0; ~

, bequests are operative and total consumption per young
agent is larger than its value in the economy without subsidy. As a consequence, the
intertemporal utility of the agents at steady state is also larger than in the economy
without subsidy.
Proof. Let us dene the net product function (see gure 1)
(l)  F (1
l
; 1)  1 + n
l
: (31)
which reaches its maximum at l^ (Golden-rule). The total production per young agent
net of investment can be rewritten as
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z() =
L0t
Nt
 (l) +
mL1t
Nt

 
l1

(32)
where L0t+mL
1
t = Nt. Thus, z () appears as an average of  (l
) and  (l1), weighted
by the shares of the total labor force Nt employed in each sector. Moreover, without
pension funds (i.e.  = 0), production per young agent reaches the modied golden-
rule level z (0) =  (l).
Let us dene ~l, such that


~l

=  (l) : (33)
Since l1 () decreases from l to 0 when  goes from 0 to , then there exists a unique
value ~ of the subsidy rate such that l1

~

= ~l and we have8
~ = (1  )
 
1 
~l
l
!
(34)
Thus, from equation (32), z () is higher than z (0) for all values of  such that
~l < l1 () < l.
For any  in (0; ~), as long as bequests are positive, total consumption z() is
larger than its value for  = 0. Thus, at least one consumption will also increase.
Moreover, di¤erentiating U
0
c (c; d) =
1+n

U
0
d (c; d) with respect to z, one obtains
dc
dz

 U 00cc +
U 0c
U 0d
U 00cd

=
dd
dz

 U
0
c
U 0d
U 00dd + U
00
cd

where Assumption 1 implies that both terms into brackets are positive. Thus, c and
d are increasing with respect to z. Consequently, for any  in (0; ~), the life-cycle
utility U(c(); d()) and the altruistic utility U(c(); d())=(1   ) are larger than
their levels for  = 0.
If  2 = 0, bequest writes
x() = c() + () +  1()  w = c() + (1 + n)k()  F 0L(1; l):
From Proposition 3, k() is increasing, and for 0 <  < ~, c() > c(0). This implies
x() > x(0) and thus x() > 0 if x(0) > 0:
8From (29) for  = 0 and  = ~; one deduces that
1 + n

1
l
= F (
1
l
; 1)  F 0L(1; l)
and 
1  ~
 1 + n

1
~l
= F (
1
~l
; 1)  F 0L(1; l)
Taking the di¤erence between the two equations, the characterization of ~ is obtained from equation
(33).
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Figure 1: the function (l)
The introduction of pension funds increases capital stock. In the economy with-
out pension funds, a rise in capital stock leads to an increase in disposable product
for consumption as long as the economy is in underaccumulation. However, pension
funds introduce imperfect competition, which has a detrimental e¤ect on the allo-
cation of productive factors. Notably, capital marginal product in noncompetitive
rms is equal to (1   ) times capital marginal product in the competitive sector
(R1 = (1   )R0). Our results show that the disposable product for consumption
continues to increase with  above ^ such that l1(^) = l^. Thus, it increases with
capital stock above the golden rule. But when  (and capital stock) is larger, the
share of the product used for investment becomes too high, and then consumptions
decrease. At  = ~, consumptions fall back to their level in the economy without
pension funds. Thus utility is higher with pension funds when 0 <  < ~, and is
maximum for some value  such that ^ <  < ~.
Remark 4 For  > ~, total consumption per young agent and welfare are lower in
the economy with pension funds than in the economy without, as long as bequests
are operative. When preferences are homothetic, bequests are operative for all ,
0 <  <  (see Appendix 4).
We represent the steady state utility level as a function of  in the Cobb-Douglas
case (U(c; d) = ln c + (1=3) ln d, F (K;L) = K1=3L2=3,  = 1=2, m = 1, n = 0). In
that case,  = 1 and bequests are operative for all . Figure 2 represents the life-cycle
utility U(). In order to illustrate the distortions resulting from the noncompetitive
allocation of productive factors, we also represent the utility U^() which could be
obtained with total capital stock k(), perfect competition and unchanged life-cycle
arbitrage condition. In our model, the subvention rate has two e¤ects: rst, a rise in
 has the usual positive e¤ect on capital accumulation; second, it raises the distortive
e¤ect of pension funds since their market power increases. Figure 2 illustrates the
strength of this second e¤ect. The larger , the larger the di¤erence U^() U() is.
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[Insert Figure 2]
We have shown that pension funds could have positive e¤ects on the steady-
state intertemporal utility. Nevertheless, we are able to give some insights about
the intertemporal utility of all generations from period 0. Let us assume that the
subsidy rate allows a welfare improvement in the long-run. For the rst generation,
the competitive equilibrium (which is obtained without pension funds) is identi-
cal to the optimum of a social planner who would maximize the same discounted
sum of utilities. Since the inception of pension funds introduces distortions through
imperfect competition and the subsidy rate, the intertemporal utility of the rst gen-
eration necessarily decreases. But pension funds increases capital accumulation in
the long-run. Therefore, intertemporal utility increases from some future generation.
3.3 E¤ect of the number of noncompetitive rms
As seen in Proposition 3, the numberm of noncompetitive rms decreases the capital
stock per young agent in the competitive sector but increases the total capital stock
per young agent. We study the e¤ect of m on welfare in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume  2 = 0 and bequests are operative in the economy without
pension funds. Then, for all , 0 <  < ~, the utility of the agents at steady-state is
increasing in m. For  > ~, this utility is decreasing in m, as long as bequests are
operative. The operative bequests property holds for all  < , when preferences are
homothetic.
Proof. The equilibrium value of noncompetitive labor-capital ratio l1 is determined
by the arbitrage condition (29) and does not depend on m. From Proposition 4,
z()  z(0) = mk1l1   l1   (l)
where (l1)   (l) > 0 i¤  < ~. Thus, for  < ~ (> ~), the e¤ect of m on z() is
positive (negative) since mk1 is increasing with m (Proposition 3).
When preferences are homothetic, the property of increasing desired bequests
(see Appendix 4) implies that if bequests are positive for  = 0, they are positive
for all , 0 <  < :
The addition of steady state resources for consumption, z() z(0) is proportional
to mk1, with a proportional factor independent of m and positive (negative) if  < ~
( > ~). As mk1 increases with m, z() increases if  < ~ and decreases if  > ~.
Figure 3 represents z()   z(0) for di¤erent values of m and the same value of the
other parameters as gure 2.
[Insert Figure 3]
As in Proposition 3, for a given value of , an increase in the number of non-
competitive rms m raises the share of capital stock held by the pension funds,
leaving their labor-capital ratio l1 unchanged. If the subsidy rate is su¢ ciently low
(0 <  < ~), the benecial e¤ect of pension funds is strengthened. Conversely, for a
high subsidy rate ( > ~), the detrimental e¤ect of pension funds is worsened.
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3.4 Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of our results in di¤erent contexts. First, we investigate
the inuence of distortive tax. Secondly, we study the impact of a change in the
fertility rate in order to take the phenomenon of ageing into account.
3.4.1 Distortive taxes
Until now, we have assumed lump-sum taxation. One may wonder if pension funds
would have similar consequences when tax instruments are distortive. In our model,
labor supply is inelastic. Thus, tax  1 paid by the young may be viewed as a tax
on labor earnings without loss of generality. However, tax on the old should be
distortive as it hits savings revenue. Let us assume that the lump-sum tax  2 is
replaced by a linear tax on savings revenue at rate .
Under this assumption, equation (28) becomes
R0 = F
0
K(1; l
0) =
1 + n
(1  )  ;
leading to a value l0 () of the labor-capital ratio in the competitive sector which
is greater than l. Tax on savings has the usual e¤ect of increasing the labor-
capital ratio. Nevertheless, the arbitrage condition (29) and the resource constraint
(30) are not modied. Moreover, the marginal rate of substitution between both
consumptions u
0
c(c();d())
u
0
d(c();d())
= (1  )R0 = 1+n

remains unchanged.
The rise in the labor-capital ratio l0 () enlarges the interval of values of labor-
capital ratios of the noncompetitive sector l1, leading to a higher level of long-run
utility. This interval is denoted by

~l () ; l0 ()

. Figure 4 shows how this interval
is widened when the distortive tax on savings is introduced. With equation (34), it
appears that the threshold on the subsidy rate ~ () that guarantees an increase of
the long-run utility is higher.
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Figure 4: impact of distortive taxes
Linear taxes on savings lead to an underaccumulation of capital relative to the
economy without distortive taxes. Since subsidies on pension funds tend to increase
capital accumulation, taxes on savings increase the potential benets of pension
funds.
3.4.2 Ageing parameter
The fertility rate is the parameter of our model that allows us to consider change in
the demographic structure. Whatever the fertility rate n is, there exists an interval
0; ~ (n)

of values of the subsidy rate such that the introduction of pension funds
increases steady-state life-cycle utility. Let us study variations of ~ (n) with respect
to n. An increase in n has two contradictory e¤ects. (1) First, it results in a rise
in the gross interest rate R0 = 1+n

that leads to a larger labor-capital ratio l (n).
For a given function , this implies a smaller value of ~l (n). From equation (34),
this rst e¤ect tends to increase the threshold ~. (2) Secondly, the increase in n
moves the function  downwards. This corresponds to the standard dilution e¤ect:
for a given labor capital ratio, an increase in the population growth rate leaves lower
resources for consumption. This second e¤ect increases the ratio ~l (n) =l (n) and,
from equation (34), reduces ~. Consequently, the resulting e¤ect is indeterminate.
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From equation (33), we obtain
F (1; l)  (1 + n) = F ( l

~l
; l)  (1 + n) l

~l
(35)
where F
0
K(1; l
) = 1+n

. From equation (34), the threshold ~ is increasing with
l=~l

. Furthermore, equation (35) determines

l=~l

as a function of the fertility
rate n. By di¤erentiation, one obtains
d

l=~l

dn
=
h
F 0L(1; ~l)  F 0L(1; l)
i
dl
dn
 

l
~l
  1

(1 + n)  F 0K(1; ~l)
:
Recalling that l > l^ > ~l; we deduce that the denominator is positive and that
F 0L(1; ~l) > F
0
L(1; l
). The rst term in the numerator corresponds to the positive
e¤ect (1) on the threshold ~. The second term corresponds to the negative dilution
e¤ect (2). The respective size of both e¤ects depends on the shape of the production
function.
For instance, for a Cobb-Douglas production function F (K;L) = KL1 , 0 <
 < 1, the numerator can be rewritten as
l
1 + n
h
F 0L(1; ~l)  F 0L(1; l)
i 1 + n
l
dl
dn
 

1 + n
~l
  1 + n
l

=
l
1 + n

(l)    1 + n
l

 

~l
 
  1 + n
~l

= 0
where the last equality results from 

~l

=  (l). In this case, the fertility rate has
no e¤ect on the value of the threshold ~.
4 Constrained bequests and change of regime
Until now, we have assumed that bequests were operative, so that savings were
based on labor and capital incomes. In this section, we analyze the regime where
the non-negativity constraint on bequests is binding. In this case, the intertemporal
equilibrium with altruistic agents coincides with the equilibrium with non-altruistic
agents: with no bequest, each agent simply consumes his life-cycle income and
savings are only supported by current labor income.
As in the preceding section, we shall assume that the lump-sum taxes that nance
the subsidies of pension funds are paid by young agents (i.e.  2 = 0). This is the most
favorable case for bequests to be operative. Moreover, suppose that, with  2 = 0,
bequests are zero in the economy with no pension funds ( = 0). By continuity,
there exists an interval of values of the subsidy rate (0; ) such that bequests are
zero. The corresponding steady-state with zero bequest has been studied in detail
by Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002, 2003) assuming a Cobb-Douglas production
function. The main results are the following.
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There exist three e¤ects of pension funds on capital accumulation. On the one
hand, there are two negative e¤ects on the net wage income of young agents :
taxation which nances the subsidies; a decrease in wages resulting from the behavior
of the noncompetitive rms. On the other hand, there may be a positive e¤ect of
the increased savings returns, that occurs only if the substitution e¤ect dominates
the income e¤ect (i.e. savings are an increasing function of capital return). When
the substitution e¤ect does not dominate the income e¤ect, all e¤ects are negative
and capital accumulation decreases with . This is in sharp contrast with the case
of operative bequests.
When the economy is in underaccumulation without pension funds, steady-state
welfare is always lower when pension funds are introduced (even if steady-state
capital stock is higher). Only in overaccumulation, welfare is higher for small values
of the subsidy rate .
With altruistic agents when bequests are constrained, the equilibrium corre-
sponds to the one obtained in an economy with egoistic agents. Thus, in the case
of constrained bequests, the discussion above allows to understand the impact of
pension funds on welfare. But, as stated in the following proposition, under the
assumption of homothetic preferences, there exists a threshold  on the subsidy rate
such that, if  > , bequests become operative. Therefore, if  < , the framework
reduces to the one studied in Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002, 2003); if  > ;
results derived in section 3 of the current paper apply.
Let us dene the desired bequest xd() as the solution of the steady-state equi-
librium conditions with no restriction on the sign of x, i.e. condition (23) is veried
with equality. It is supposed to be negative for  = 0. All the results (except the
sign of x) of the preceding section apply to this "desired" steady-state.
Proposition 6 Assume  2 = 0, xd(0) < 0 and homothetic preferences. The desired
bequest xd() is an increasing function of  and it becomes positive after some thresh-
old  < . As a consequence, in the long run, bequests are constrained if 0   < 
and bequests are positive if  <  < .
Proof. See Appendix 4. 
As a consequence, if bequests are constrained without pension funds, the in-
troduction of pension funds with some appropriate subsidy rate ( > ) will make
bequests operative.
When bequests are operative, the analysis of the preceding section applies. As-
suming underaccumulation of capital at the competitive equilibrium without pension
funds ( = 0), utility decreases on the interval (0; ). Then there are two cases:
 either utility increases in the operative bequests regime, reaches a maximum
and this maximum is larger than the utility at  = 0 (case 1),
 or, for all  > 0, the utility remains lower in the economy with pension funds
than in the economy without (case 2).
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In the rst case, the introduction of pension funds with an appropriate value
of the subsidy rate can improve long-run intertemporal utility of the agents. In
the second case, the welfare e¤ect of pension funds is always negative whatever the
subsidy rate is.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6]
The parameters are the same as before, except . A lower  increases modied
Golden-Rule labor-capital ratio l, and reduces the desired bequest. This bequest
at  = 0 is zero for  = 1=2. Thus for  > 1=2, bequests are always operative. For
 < 1=2, the desired bequest is negative at  = 0, and there is a change of regime at
. Near  = 1=2 (Figure 5 with  = 2=5), we are in the rst case : utility becomes
larger than its value in the economy without pension funds, but for low , it does
not (Figure 6 with  = 1=5).
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the long-run e¤ect of pension funds in an economy where people
are altruistic. We assume that pension funds behave noncompetitively and that
contributions are subsidized.
The main results are the following. If bequests are operative, total capital stock
with pension funds is higher than without pension funds and increases with the
subsidy rate. So, despite the fall in wages that occurs with the noncompetitive
behavior of pension funds, savings increase because of the rise in capital income. This
leads to an increase in long-run welfare as long as the subsidy rate remains under
some threshold. Above this threshold, capital stock becomes too high, putting the
economy in overaccumulation, and the distortions created by imperfect competition
are too great. Moreover, given a not too large subsidy rate, a rise in the number of
pension funds increases long-run utility.
Finally, with homothetic preferences, we show that an increase in the subsidy
rate can move the economy from constrained bequests to operative bequests. Then,
if bequests are constrained in the economy without pension funds, the positive e¤ect
of pension funds on welfare is no longer guaranteed.
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Appendix 1. Characterization of the FirmsCournot-Walras Equilibrium
(FCWE)
We rst characterize the best-response function of noncompetitive rms.
Lemma 1 Under assumption F 000LLL  0 and given labor capital ratios of other non-
competitive rms
 
ljt

j 6=i which satises
P
j 6=i l
j
tK
j
t < Nt; there exists a unique best
response function lit for the rm i: It is the solution of
F
0
L
 
1; lit
  F 0L  1; l0t ()+ litKitK0t F 00LL  1; l0t () = 0 (36)
where l0t ()  Nt 
Pm
j=1 l
j
tK
j
t
K0t
is a function of all labor capital ratios (lit)i=1;:::;m. It
satises lit < l
0
t ().
Proof. Since labor supply to the competitive rm is Nt  
Pm
i=1 L
i
t, wages are a
function of labor demands Lit, i = 1; :::;m,
wt = F
0
L
 
K0t ; Nt  
mX
i=1
Lit
!
 !t
 
L1t ; :::; L
m
t

:
We write prots of rm i as a function of the labor demands (L1t ; :::; L
m
t ) :
it = F
 
Kit ; L
i
t
  !t  L1t ; :::; Lmt Lit:
Let us dene
it 
it
Kit
= F
 
1; lit
  litF 0L1; Nt   litKit   L itK0t

where L it 
P
j 6=i L
j
t < Nt. Prots maximization is equivalent to maximization of
it with respect to l
i
t 2
 
0; (Nt   L it )=Kit

. First order condition is
@it
@lit
= F
0
L
 
1; lit
  F 0L1; Nt   litKit   L itK0t

+ lit
Kit
K0t
F "LL

1;
Nt   litKit   L it
K0t

= 0:
At lit goes to 0, we have
@it
@lit
> 0, since F
0
L(1; 0) > F
0
L(1; (Nt   L it )=K0t ). Moreover,
if lit  (Nt L it )=(K0t +Kit), then lit  (Nt  litKit  L it )=K0t , and we have @
i
t
@lit
< 0.
Thus, there exists lit 2

0; (Nt   L it )=Kit

where it reaches its maximum.
The second partial derivative of it is
@2it
@li2t
= F 00LL
 
1; lit

+ 2
Kit
K0t
F 00LL
 
1; l0t
  litKitK0t
2
F
000
LLL
 
1; l0t

where l0t  Nt 
Pm
j=1 l
j
tK
j
t
K0t
. Since F
000
LLL  0, it is strictly concave and the rst order
conditions are su¢ cient.
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The rst-order condition (36) implies F
0
L(1; l
i
t) > F
0
L(1; l
0
t ). Thus l
i
t < l
0
t .
We now prove Proposition 1. Equation (36) writes as:
Gt
 
lit; l
0
t ()

= 0
where
Gt
 
li; l0
  F 0L  1; li  F 0L  1; l0+ liKitK0t F 00LL  1; l0 :
The function Gt (li; l0) has the following properties, for any l0 > 0:
Gt
 
0; l0

= F
0
L (1; 0)  F
0
L
 
1; l0

> 0
and
Gt
 
l0; l0

= l0
Kit
K0t
F 00LL
 
1; l0

< 0:
As
@Gt
@li
= F 00LL
 
1; li

+
Kit
K0t
F "LL
 
1; l0

< 0
and
@Gt
@l0
=  F 00LL
 
1; l0

+ li
Kit
K0t
F 000LLL
 
1; l0

> 0
the equation Gt (li; l0) = 0 denes a function li = 
i
t (l
0) ; which is continuous and
increasing on R+: The equation Gt (li; l0) = 0 implies F
0
L (1; l
i) > F
0
L (1; l
0) ; and
thus li = it (l
0) < l0: It follows that it (l
0) tends to 0 when l0 tends to 0.
Let us now consider the market equilibrium condition
Gt
 
lit; l
0
t

= 0
which is equivalent to
lit = 
i
t
 
l0t

:
The equilibrium on the labor market is equivalent to:
K0t l
0
t +
mX
i=1
it
 
l0t

Kit = Nt
The left-hand side goes from 0 to +1 as l0t goes from 0 to +1: Thus, this equation
denes a unique value for l0t and l
i
t = 
i
t (l
0
t ) ; i = 1; ::::;m:
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 2.
The equality of gross returns on all investments
Rit = R
1
t ; 8i = 2; :::;m:
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and
R1t = (1  t 1)R0t :
implies the equality lit = l
1
t , i = 2; :::;m. Indeed, for the equilibrium value l
0
t , the
derivative of F (1; li)   liF 0L(1; l0t ) with respect to li is F 0L(1; li)   F 0L(1; l0t ), and is
positive for li < l0t . Thus the labor-capital ratio l
i
t < l
0
t such that R
i
t = (1  t 1)R0t
is unique and the equality of returns implies the equality of labor-capital ratio of
all noncompetitive rms lit = l
1
t , i = 2; :::;m. Given l
0
t , equation (8) F
0
L (1; l
1
t )  
F
0
L (1; l
0
t )+l
1
t
Kit
K0t
F "LL (1; l
0
t ) = 0 impliesK
i
t = K
1
t , i = 2; :::;m. We deduce immediately
Lit = L
1
t , i = 2; :::;m.
Appendix 3. E¤ect of pension funds on capital accumulation.
We dene the labor ratio  = L
1
t
L0t
= l
1k1
l0k0
=
F
0
L(1;l
1) F 0L(1;l)
 F "LL(1;l)l
from (24).
When  increases from 0 to , l1() decreases from l to 0; thus () increases
from 0 to
 =
F
0
L(1; 0)  F 0L(1; l)
 F "LL(1; l)l
:
 is equal to +1 if and only if F 0L(1; 0) = +1.
With (25), 1 + m = 1
lk0 . Thus, k
0() decreases from 1=l to 1= [l(1 +m)]
when  increases from 0 to .
Thus, ml1k1 = 1  lk0 increases from 0 to m
1+m
, and k1() increases from 0 to
+1. Finally, total capital per young agent k = k0 + mk1 = 1
l (1 +mk
1(l   l1))
increases from 1=l to +1.
Let us study the e¤ect of m. For given , k0 = 1
l(1+m) decreases with m (since
 does not depend on m). Moreover l1k1 = 1
m
(1  lk0) = 
1+m
decreases with m.
Since l1 and  do not depend on m, k1 decreases with m, but mk1 increases with
m. Thus, the total capital stock k = 1
l (1 +mk
1(l   l1)) increases with m.
Appendix 4. Study of the desired bequest function.
We study the steady-state equilibrium satisfying equations (19)-(27), with equa-
tion (23) satised with equality and assuming  2 = 0.
The function xd() is dened by
xd() = c() + (1 + n)k()  F 0L(1; l):
With the assumption of homothetic preferences, the condition U
0
c(c; d) =
1+n

U
0
d(c; d)
implies that c() is in proportion to d(). Thus, we have
c() = z(); with z() = c() +
d()
1 + n
and 0 <  < 1:
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We deduce c() + (1 + n)k() = z() + (1 + n)k() and
@xd
@
= 
@z
@
+ (1 + n)
@k
@
:
Since
z() = k0F (1; l) + F (k   k0; 1  k0l)  (1 + n)k;
we obtain @z
@
= A@k
0
@
+ B @k
@
, where A() = F (1; l)   F 0K(1; l1)   lF 0L(1; l1), and
B() = F
0
K(1; l
1)  (1 + n). The partial derivative of A is
@A
@
=
@l1
@
 F "KL(1; l1)  lF "LL(1; l1) = @l1@ (l1   l)F "LL(1; l1);
since F "KL(1; l
1) =  l1F "LL(1; l1). We have @l
1
@
< 0, l1 < l and F "LL < 0. This implies
@A
@
< 0. Since A(0) = F (1; l) F 0K(1; l)  lF 0L(1; l) = 0, we have A() < 0 for all
 > 0 and A@k
0
@
> 0.
Thus, we obtain
@xd
@
= A
@k0
@
+
h
F
0
K(1; l
1) + (1 + n)(1  )
i @k
@
:
Since A@k
0
@
is non-negative and @k
@
is positive (Proposition 3), we deduce that for all
, 0 <  < , @x
d
@
> 0.
Let us now show that bequests are positive for  su¢ ciently large. As long as
bequests are zero, the income of young agents is F
0
L(1; l
)  1 = F 0L(1; l) mk1().
For  su¢ ciently high, we have mk1() > F
0
L(1; l
), since mk1() tends to +1
when  tends to . Thus, bequests are necessarily positive after some  < .
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